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POWER ETHINICIZED:
THE PURSUIT OF PROTECTION AND PARTICIPATION
IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI
Linda Maguire *
The Hutu-Tutsi conflict is a relatively recent phenomenon ... not composed
of ancestral hatreds and supposed supremacy, but of modern politics.
Ren6 Lemarchand'
There's never been any ethnic conflict between the groups on the level of
the village. There was no ethnic war before independence. It's the politi-
cians who transfer their political conflicts onto the hillsides. If the leaders
say nothing then the killings don't happen.
Maj. Pierre Buyoya
President of Burundi (1987-1993)2
* Editor-in-Chief, 1994-1995, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; Master Degree Candidate
1995 at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; B.A. Degree in International
Relations and French, Tufts University.
1 Recent Violence in Burundi: What should be the U.S. Response?: Hearings
and Markup on H. Con. Res. 371 Before the Subcomm. (1988) (Statment of Ren6
Lemarchand, Professor of Political Science, University of Florida).
2 Mark Huband, Voice of the Massacres, THE GuARDiAN, Jan. 29, 1994, at 10.
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INTRODUCTION
"TERROR CONVULSES RWANDAN CAPITAL AS TRIBES
BATTLE," the front page headline of the New York Times announced on
April 9, 1994.' A companion piece went on to describe the history of
Rwanda as one replete with inter-ethnic contention and violence, implying
that senseless "tribal" warfare has existed there from time immemorial and
should thus come as no surprise now.4 Such reporting at best gives an overly
simplistic view of a complex situation; at its worst it perpetuates prevalent
stereotypes which obscure far greater intricacies. Recent accounts of violence
in both Rwanda and Burundi clearly fit the latter category.
In reality, the central African nations of Rwanda and Burundi defy
neat categorization. These two countries remain enigmatic or unknown in the
West, in part because they have not figured prominently in geopolitical
struggles, and in part because they are small and remote. Each is roughly the
size of Vermont, yet their combined populations number over thirteen million
people.5 Rwanda and Burundi are thus two of the most densely populated
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rwanda is currently number one with 256
people per square kilometer), and both are characterized by extremely high
birth rates.6 Most of the population is rurally concentrated and engaged in
subsistence farming of cash crops, of which coffee and tea are the largest.
For many Westerners, knowledge of this area is confined to the
experiences of the American Diane Fossey, who was killed in Rwanda while
studying the gorillas indigenous to the mountain jungles there. A comprehen-
sive understanding of the region is thwarted by the fact that virtually every
time Rwanda and Burundi appear in the news, it is in relation to a new out-
burst of violence. However, the experiences of Rwanda and Burundi speak
volumes about the distinction between group and individual rights, the chal-
lenges of accommodating minority and majority interests, and the root causes
3 William E. Schmidt, Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1994, at Al.
4 Jerry Gray, Two Nations Joined by Common History of Genocide, N. Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 9, 1994, at 6.
5 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Reports for Burundi and
Rwanda (4th Quarter 1993), at 4 and 6.
6 CATHRINE WATSON, THE U.S. COMMrTEE FOR REFUGEES, EXILE FROM RWANDA:




Despite claims to the contrary, the ethnic polarization within Rwanda
and Burundi is neither historic, nor intractable. The violence this polarization
engenders is likewise largely a recent phenomenon perpetrated by specific
elements of society for very definable reasons. To cast the conflict in terms
of tribal warfare and ancestral enmities is to miss its underlying causes, and
thereby eliminate any chance at an effective solution to it. This paper will
study the histories and inter-ethnic relations of both countries and the at-
tempts various other states have made to respond to the needs of the majori-
ties and minorities within their borders. It will also offer some prescriptive
recommendations for the future.
I. RACE, TRIBE AND ETHNICITY
No discussion of Rwanda and Burundi can advance very far without
mentioning the extreme ethnic stratification which characterizes both coun-
tries. The three major ethnic groups which comprise both populations are the
Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa. Despite the lack of a reliable census since 1962,
it is thought that Rwanda's population is eighty-nine percent Hutu, ten percent
Tutsi and one percent Twa, while Burundi's are eighty-five percent Hutu,
fourteen percent Tutsi and one percent Twa.1 There are some slight physio-
logical differences between groups: the Tutsi are generally tall and thin with
facial features resembling those of Ethiopians or Somalis, while the Hutu tend
to be shorter and stouter. The Twa, traditionally forest dwellers, hunters and
pottery crafters, are even shorter than the Hutu, and, when first encountered
by Europeans, were labelled as "pygmies." Physical distinction among
groups in Burundi and Rwanda is an extremely sensitive issue and justifiably
so. In the past, these differences have been used to create psychological
divisions where none had previously existed, and also to justify oppression of
the majority by the minority. What should be remembered, however, is that
despite some differences in physical appearance, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are
culturally homogeneous: they speak the same Bantu languages, profess the
same religions and have common traditions. A more extensive discussion of
inter-ethnic relations between these groups appears below, but at this point it
may be useful to define some terms.
The terms "race," "ethnicity" and "tribe" are problematic in their
ambiguity. Human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration 1f
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
7 PATRICK BROGAN, THE FIGHTING NEVER STOPPED 14 (1990).
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Genocide Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, tend to lump "race," "ethnicity" and "color" together
when prohibiting grounds of distinction in the entitlement to human rights,'
yet none of these documents defines the terms. This is undoubtedly deliber-
ate, as the virtual impossibility of reaching a consensus on their meaning
would probably preclude any progress whatsoever in codifying human rights
norms. This is not to say attempts have not been made to clarify what consti-
tutes a "race", "ethnicity" or "tribe".
Until 1950, the term "race" was used interchangeably with that of
"ethnicity" (from the Greek word ethos, or nation),9 to define a group which
both subjectively and objectively constitutes a "people."'" Eventually, how-
ever, the term "race" came to signify the physiological and genetic similarities
among peoples, while "ethnicity" came to signify the more subjective, cultural
links which a group perceived as common to all its members." Thus, "ethnic-
ity" came to connote the widest group, within which different "races" could
fall.
For the purposes of this paper, the term "race" is used to define a
people belonging to a common broad anthropological group, possessing traits
which are transmissible from generation to generation, and unified by com-
mon interests, habits or characteristics. "Ethnicity," a racial transcendent, is
used here to refer to large groups of people who share a common, often
ambiguous, combination of tribe, religion, language or culture. On a much
smaller scale, the term "tribe" describes a social group made up of numerous
familial and generational subgroups which are united by common interests,
occupation or political affiliation. From the preceding definitions, it is clear
that the term "tribe" is inadequate and potentially confusing if used to de-
scribe the respective groups of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. While these three
groups might conceivably be classified as "tribes", the term does not clarify
8 PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 158-
59(1991).
9 WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING, 100
(1994).
1o THORNBERRY, supra note 8, at 159.
11 THORNBERRY, supra note 8, at 159-60. A UNESCO Committee of Experts
charged with studying race problems, came up with a definition of what distinguishes
race from ethnicity. In the UNESCO Statement on Race (1950), the Committee
stated that the term "race" describes physical differences between peoples, particu-




matters since there are also many different subgroups within each "tribe".
Each of these, in turn, could qualify as a "tribe". The distinctions between
"clan" and "tribe", and "tribe" and "ethnicity", are often impossible to delin-
eate. What is clear, however, is that what distinguishes Hutu from Tutsi from
Twa hinges on differences greater than merely those of "tribe". Further, the
term is problematic for its negative connotations. Too often the word has
been associated with regressiveness and senseless combat) 2
The term "race" is equally unhelpful. While the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
do possess some physiological traits capable of transmission from generation
to generation, they all belong to a common broad anthropological group and
are unified by common interests, habits and characteristics. To label the
distinction between these groups as "racial" then, is akin to claiming that a
southern Italian who possesses a dark complexion belongs to a different racial
group than her fairer-skinned northern compatriot. Emphasizing the differ-
ences between race and ethnicity within the context of Rwanda and Burundi,
is academic, in that the major ethnic groups are all composed of a single race.
We are thus left, with "ethnicity," which is probably the most appro-
priate label for what distinguishes Hutu, Tutsi and Twa from one another.
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are distinct groups whose members share a subjective
perception of their common culture. However, one qualification needs to be
noted. In many, if not most, societies in Africa, ethnic stratification evolved
horizontally, not vertically. 3
That is, ethnic groups existed side by side, separated entirely by
differences in language or culture. In Rwanda and Burundi, however, ethnic
stratification took on a vertical configuration in which culturally and linguisti-
cally homogeneous ethnic groups were arranged in a complex hierarchical
power structure. How this arrangement came into being, and how the colo-
nizing Europeans reacted to it, are both essential to understanding the present
tension between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.
II. HISTORICAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Pre-colonial
12 Dr. Conor C. O'Brien, Remarks at Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, An
Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC) symposium held
at Tufts University,(March 2-6 1994).
13 Ren6 Lemarchand, Burundi in Comparative Perspective, in The Politics of
Ethnic Conflict Regulation, at 159 (John MeGany and Brendan OLeary eds.,
Routledge 1993).
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The modem day States of Rwanda and Burundi are unique among
African nations in at least three respects: they were populated by a single
people in each instance -- the Kinyarwanda in Rwanda and the Barundi in
Burundi; 4 their borders have remained essentially unchanged throughout
their histories; and they were both relatively late arrivals on the colonial
scene. 5 Bordered by mountains in the West and North and swamps in the
East, and armed with a reputation of fierce inhabitants, the area which
became known as Ruanda-Urundi' 6 remained isolated until the late nineteenth
century. 17 It was not until 1892 that the first German-led expeditions pene-
trated the interior. The establishment of military outposts quickly followed,
and by 1899, the Germans exercised defacto control of the area they called
Mittel Afrika.'8
B. German East Africa (1899-1916)
German policies during the colonial era differed sharply between
Rwanda and Burundi. In Burundi, a policy of non-intervention became one of
power consolidation, and eventually evolved into a "divide and rule"
strategy.' 9 Where the use of violence was fairly common in the German
attempt to solidify control of Burundi, the conquest of Rwanda was more
peaceful. The fact that Rwanda was, at the turn of the century, a far more
centralized state certainly helped matters because, once the center was con-
quered, the parts were easier to control.20
From 1899 until World War I, Rwanda and Burundi formed part of
the colonial bloc of Deutsche Ost Afrika, which was administered from Dar
es Salaam. There was never a large-scale settlement of the region by German
14 Both the Banyarwanda and the Barundi include members of the Hutu, Tutsi, and
Twa ethnic groups.
15 Antoine Nyagatere, Mythes et Iddologies: Le Cas de I'Histoire du Peuplement
du Rwanda Ancien, in Les Rdlations Interethniques au Rwanda A la Lumi~re de
'Agression d'Octobre 1990, 19 (Editions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1991).
16 Although the nomenclature "Ruanda-Urundi" did not enjoy wide usage until the
Belgian occupation, it is used here to signify the region of present-day Rwanda and
Burundi during the entire colonial era.
17 W.M. Louis, RUANDA-URUNDI 103 (1963).
'8 Id. at 104
19 REN LEMARCHAND, RWANDA AND BuRuNDi 51 (1970).
20 Id. at 57.
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nationals partly because it was inacessible and already overpopulated. While
human rights abuses on the part of the colonizers undeniably occurred, the
German tenure is looked upon as a relatively peaceful, easily forgotten inter-
lude during the colonial age.2
C. The Belgian Mandate (1919-World War 1)22
The same cannot be said of the Belgian occupation, however. In the
peace settlement following World War I, the victorious powers ceded the area
of Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium, in part as payback for Belgian losses in the
war, and in part because Belgium was already in the Congo territory to the
West' Ironically, Belgium did not want the two territories. Its real objective
was to control the southern bank and source of the Congo river, which was
located in territory then controlled by Portugal, and it thought staking a claim
in Ruanda-Urundi would advance this goal.24 In the end, it was the British,
not the Belgians, who wound up with the large land grants. The Milner-Orts
Agreement of May 30 1919 ceded to Belgium only that portion of German
East Africa which comprised Ruanda-Urundi, and rendered it a Belgian
mandate to be administered in conjunction with the Congo territory.
The Belgian history in Ruanda-Urundi is a long and complicated one
and the space here limited. Thus, any description of political tactics during
this period must be summarized in an abbreviated form. In short, the Belgian
residency resembled the German because it embraced a policy of indirect rule.
However, the Belgians went one step further and actually redefined the ruling
elite. Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs were replaced by Tutsi, and the Hutu were
systematically eliminated from participation in political, educational and
judicial institutions.' Apparently, this was done with the rationale that the
Tutsi were "... better qualified, more intelligent, more active, more capable of
appreciating progress and more fully accepted by the people."26 Leadership
positions, missionary education, and economic advancement were some of the
advantages members of the Tutsi ethnic group enjoyed during the Belgian
21 Louis, supra note 17, at 254.
22 In 1916, the area was conquered by the British and occupied by British and
Belgian troops until 1919.
23 BROGAN, supra note 7 at 15.
24 Louis, supra note 17, at 255.
25 LEMARCHAD, supra note 19, at 73.
26 Id. at 73 (quote from Monseigneur Classe, a Catholic missionary in Rwanda
(1930)).
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mandate. Once again, however, the situation was not identical in both re-
gions.
In Rwanda, the Belgian policy of preferential treatment resulted in a
far more pronounced polarization between Hutu and Tutsi. Educational
requirements for admission into secondary schooling, for example, were
skewed to favor almost exclusively Tutsi. In Rwanda, the political system
had always beeh more centralized and thus greater power was concentrated in
the individual leaders. The Tutsi of Rwanda, having experienced the benefits
of power, felt a considerable desire to retain that acquired position of privi-
lege. In Burundi, however, the dichotomy between Hutu and Tutsi was less
pronounced. Admittedly, the Belgian policy there also favored the Tutsi,
however this was done within the context of a more decentralized political
system. There were far more Hutu classified as chiefs and as belonging to the
aristocracy, and the percentage of Hutu children in secondary schooling was
considerably higher than in Rwanda.2 7
D. The Belgian Trust (World War H-1962)
Following World War II, mandated territories such as Ruanda-
Urundi became trust territories under the auspices of the United Nations.
With the new administrative framework also came new responsibilities on the
part of administering States, namely, "to promote the political, economic,
social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories,
and their progressive development towards self-government or indepen-
dence." ' Thus, it was incumbent upon Belgium to negotiate its trust territo-
ries towards independence as well as to submit annual reports to the General
Assembly, detailing the "political, economic, social, and educational advance-
ment" of the inhabitants of the territories.29 The process of constitution
building was slow, yet there was some significant progress made toward
independence from 1952 to 1962. Not all of the steps taken to advance that
goal, however, were positive. Where the Belgians had once clearly favored
the Tutsi, the post-World War II policy attained a more fomenting quality.
Increasingly, Hutu were encouraged by the Belgians to rise up against the
politically dominant Tutsi. In Rwanda, constitutional reforms and Belgian
encouragement of Hutu discontent led to the abolition of the monarchy and
27 Id. at 75.
2 U.N. CHARTER art. 76, b.
29 U.N. CHARTER art. 88.
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the institution of a majority-led government. In Burundi, however, precisely
the opposite occurred.
E. Independence and Beyond: The Parting of the Ways
In Rwanda, early constitutional reforms which were designed to give
Hutu greater representation in government, in fact only reinforced a Tutsi lock
on power. Despite the -surface reforms, Tutsi still held all forty-three of
chiefdoms, 549 of 559 sub-chief positions, and eighty-two percent of posts in
the powerful judicial and agricultural departments. This resulted in rising
Hutu disillusion and impatience so that, by 1959, the so-called "Rwandan
Revolution" had begun. Led primarily by the Hutu-dominated, anti-monar-
chy Parti du Mouvement de l'lmancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), the push
for majority-rule resulted in local elections in 1960, which PARMEHUTU
won overwhelmingly. These developments accelerated the U.N. timetable for
Rwandan independence, and by 1962, PARMEHUTU forced the international
community's hand by abolishing the monarchy and declaring Rwanda a
republic."
A bloodless coup in 1973, led by Juvenal Habyarimana, the Minister
of Armed Forces and Police (and a Hutu), overthrew the existing administra-
tion and installed a civilian government dominated by his party, the
Mouvement R6publicain National pour la Dmocratie (MRND). By far the
greatest challenge to Habyarimana's authority was the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), a group of mostly Tutsi refugees who had fled to Uganda and
who formed an army of expatriates and Ugandan army deserters. After years
of planning, this army invaded northern Rwanda in 1990. The civil war this
attack touched off lasted three years and cost thousands of lives. On August
4, 1993, however, the Rwandan government and the rebel forces signed a
power sharing peace accord in Arusha, Tanzania. The accord allotted the
MRND six of the twenty-two ministerial posts in the new government, while
the RPF was to have five. The remaining eleven posts were reserved for other
coalitions. Despite all. the careful drafting, this fragile peace accord was
shattered immediately therafter. On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana
was assassinated and Rwanda plunged headlong into anarchy as rebel RPF
forces took Kigali.
Burundi's road to independence was quite different from that of
30 LEMARCHAND, supra note 19, at 82-85.
31 WATSON, supra note 6, at 5.
1995]
58 BUFFALO JOURNAL OFNTERNA2YONAL LAW
Rwanda's, in large part due to the different forces at play. As Ren6
Lemarchand points out in his seminal history, Rwanda and Burundi, In
contrast with what happened in Rwanda, where the major point of tension lay
in the opposition between Hutu and Tutsi, in Burundi the ethnic struggle
tended to coexist with, and cut across, a social conflict between a privileged
oligarchy [the monarch and his relatives] and a newly-emergent elite of mixed
origins whose grievances against the regime expressed their sense of revolt in
the face of a socio-political advancement to which they considered themselves
entitled? 2 In Burundi then, the fault lines of conflict lay in issues of class and
economics as much as ethnicity. Illustrative of this phenomenon is the
widespread Hutu support of the Parti de l'Unit6 et du Progrrs National
(UPRONA), a political party comprised largely of Tutsi monarchists, and
which won the legislative elections of 1961. Hutu support for this party has
been explained as a factor of intra-Hutu communal "discontinuities.13 3 In
Burundi's loose, decentralized system which emphasized loyalty to the local
chief, UPRONA leaders were revered. Thus, the severe ethnic polarization
seen in Rwanda was not immediately an issue in Burundi.
Another difference between the transition to independence in Rwanda
and Burundi was the continuance of the monarchy in Burundi until the coup
of November 28, 1966. Led by an army captain, the coup resulted in the
overthrow of the monarch and declaration of the Republic of Burundi.3 4 For
the next twenty-seven years, Burundi was ruled by three Tutsi men, two of
whom were from the exclusive Hima subgroup, a clan favored by the colonial
powers and dominant in the army. The period from 1966 until 1993, was
characterized by widespread persecution and periodic massacres of Hutu,
especially in 1972 and 1988.
Constitutional reforms set in motion by President Buyoya (1987-
1993), legalized political parties by 1992, after which time a multitude of
parties rapidly formed in anticipation of the country's first-ever presidential
elections. On June 29, 1993, Melchior Ndadaye won seventy-one percent of
the vote to become Burundi's first (and to date, only), democratically elected
president."5 He was also the first ever Hutu President. Ndadaye, a former
refugee who had been educated abroad, was a member of the Front Pour ]a
32 LEMARCHAND, supra note 19, at 290.
33 Id. at 346.
34 The army captain who led the coup was Miechel Micombero, Prime Minister
under the last reigning king of Burundi. Micombero was in power from 1966-1976;
he was succeeded by President Bagaza (1976-1987).
35 Catharine Watson, Death of Democracy, Africa Report, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 27.
[Vol. HI
POWER ETHNICIZED
D6mocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), a party formed by returning Hutu
refugee intellectuals who had fled the massacres of 1972. Top on the new
president's agenda, which was heavily influenced by contemporaneous events
in Eastern Europe, was the fostering of a civil society in Burundi to diffuse
power from the ethnicized military.36
Ndadaye promptly appointed a mixed Tutsi and Hutu cabinet, took
measures to address the refugee crisis in Burundi, and sought to reassure
Tutsi and Hutu alike that his government would pursue an agenda of social
reconciliation. Unfortunately, Ndadaye never had the chance to institute the
systemic changes he envisioned, or to see his policies of compromise come to
fruition. On October 21, 1993, barely three months after his inauguration,
Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated by a group of Tutsi army officers in an
abortive coup attempt.
The reasons for the coup attempt lay in the pace at which Ndadaye's
government tried to institute change and the corollary fear on the part of some
Tutsi that Burundi would be "Hutuized" so much so as to place the Tutsi in an
intolerably vulnerable position socially, economically and politically.37 When
support for the coup did not materialize, a backlash ensued among Hutu,
loyal to the slain President as well as hardliner Hutu who seized the opportu-
nity to purge Tutsi from positions of power and influence. The inter-ethnic
reprisal violence which followed Ndadaye's death claimed thousands of lives,
the majority of them Tutsi. 3
The political climate in Burundi since Ndadaye's assassination has
been unstable and violent. Under an agreement reached between the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations, the Burundian Army and
the Burundian civil society, Cyprien Ntaryamira, former Minister of Agricul-
ture and Livestock, became President of Burundi on February 5 1994 via a
special election by the National Assembly. Also a Hutu, Ntaryamira was
expected to carry on with Ndadaye's policies and indeed, he began by ap-
pointing twelve Tutsi as ministers in his cabinet (out of a total of twenty-six
positions).39 Less than two months after he became President, however,
Ntaryamira became another victim of assassination.
36 EIJ, Country Report on Burundi, supra note 5, at 30.
37 Burundi Assessment Mission Trip Report, National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, Jan. 1994, at 2-5, [hereinafter NDI Report].
38 Estimates of the death toll following the October 1993 coup attempt, range
from a relatively low figure of 30,000 (Human Rights Watch/Africa), to an almost
certainly incorrect figure of 200,000 (Africa Report).
39 NDI Report, supra note 37, at 1.
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F. Destinies Converge: The Assassinations ofApril 1994
While the paths of Rwanda and Burundi may have diverged at
independence, the events of April 1994, have reinforced the axiom that the
two countries share destinies. On April 6 1994, Presidents Habyarimana and
Ntaryamira were killed when the plane carrying them from a peace conference
in Tanzania crashed near Kigali, allegedly as a result of an alleged mortar fire.
It is thought that the intended target was Habyarimana and, while the identity
of those responsible is not yet known, there is strong suspicion that it was
hardliner Hutu in Habyarimana's government who felt threatened by his move
to grant a larger role to the Tutsi in Rwanda. The violence which followed
Habyadmana's death was primarily incited by these hardliners in the military
and presidential guard, and has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths,
as well as unprecedented refugee flows from the country. Burundi, on the
other hand, has remained quiet since the assassinations, yet tensions are
building there too.
While the disparity in reactions between Rwandans and Burundians
to the deaths of the Presidents may seem anomalous on its face, it is in fact
quite explicable. The violent reaction within Rwanda and the correspondling
calm in Burundi are more easily understood when studying interethnic rela-
tions in Rwanda and Burundi from a historical perspective.
III. INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS
A. Pre-Colonial
Relatively little is known about the region of Ruanda-Urundi prior to
the 1890s, and thus an accurate picture of pre-colonial ethnic relations neces-
sarily, relies heavily on oral testimony of Rwandans and Burundians as re-
corded and interpreted by scholars. The fact that these scholars differ consid-
erably in their analyses depending on their agendas, further complicates
matters. This section, therefore, draws on several sources in an attempt to
gain a more balanced view..
The first dwellers in the region of Rwanda and Burundi, and the
closest thing to an indigenous population, were the Twa.4° These pygmy-type
people have, until quite recently, been forest dwellers, potters and ironwork-
ers. The common perception is that they have inhabited the land "from time
40 JACQUES MAQUET, THE PREMISE OF INEQUALITY IN RUANDA: A STUDY OF
POLITICAL RELATIONS IN A CENTRAL AFRICAN KINGDOM, I I (196 1).
[Vol. II
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immemorial."'" Next on the migratory time line were the Hutu, a short,
stocky people, who tilled the land until the arrival of the Tutsi sometime
between the 14th and the 17th centuries.42 The Tutsi, taller and slimmer than
either the Twa or the Hutu, migrated into the area in successive stages,
bringing with them herds of longhorn cattle. Of the three ethnic groups, the
greatest controversy surrounds the origins of the Tutsi. Some claim the Tutsi
migrated into Rwanda and Burundi from the Ease and the west, along with
other Bantu-speaking peoples, while others claim the Tutsi migrated from the
northern reaches of modern Egypt and Somalia.
Regardless of their origins, once the Tutsi arrived in the area, they
established between themselves and the Hutu a clientage system of rights and
corresponding obligations, roughly resembling the feudal societies which
characterized Europe during the Middle Ages.43 The Hutu, who outnumbered
the Tutsi eight to one, harvested crops on parcels of land and paid tribute to
the Tutsi cattle-owners. The Tutsi, in turn, protected the Hutu. The Hutu
thus played the role of the peasant, and the Tutsi that of the lords; the Twa,
being forest dwellers, were essentially unaffected by this system.
Demographics played a central role in defining the terms of the social
contract between Hutu and Tutsi. Resources were scarce, and the economic
need was greater for agriculturalists than for pastoralists. Correspondingly,
there were more Hutu agriculturalists than Tutsi pastoralists.44 The fact that
wealth, and thus prestige, emanated from the ownership of cattle meant that
the small group which controlled this scarce resource (the Tutsi), enjoyed a
more privileged place in the society. It also meant that the system defined
itself in ethnic terms from the outset. Although the clientage system rested on
a "premise of inequality," and social or political mobility was rare, there were
tangible benefits to the arrangement. The political structure provided the
Hutu with security from the raids of neighboring villages, while the Tutsi
benefitted from Hutu hard labor.45 Because the Tutsi relied on Hutu labor for
survival, and the Hutu relied on Tutsi protection for survival, neither group
sought to eradicate the other. There is no history of inter-ethnic massacres or
41 Louis, supra note 17, at 103.
42 Victor DuBois, Population Problems, Perception, and Policy in Rwanda,
American Field Staff Reports, Mar. 1973, at 1.
43 Maquet defines a feudal system as one"... based on an agreement between
two [parties] who unequally partake in the symbols of wealth and power culturally
recognized in their society," Maquet, supra note 40, at 133.
44 Id. at 144-145.
45 Id. at 158.
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even widespread violence in Rwanda or Burundi prior to the colonial era.4"
On the contrary, the climate was characterized by "ethnic coexistence."
Mutual disdain and repulsion impeded the formation of a fully integrated
society, but a caste system functioned efficiently nonetheless.
47
The clientage system in place in Rwanda and Burundi up until the
arrival of the first Europeans, was fairly decentralized. A multitude of suzer-
ains controlled several fiefdoms each, and the suzerains in turn owed alle-
giance to one monarch. The fact that whoever controlled the sovereign could
essentially control the provinces, was immediately recognized and exploited
by the colonial powers.
B. The Germans and The French
No doubt the Tutsi regarded themselves as superior to the Hutu and
the Twa long before the Europeans reinforced the notion. Indeed, according
to their own legends, the Tutsi came from another world to settle the land of
Ruanda-Urundi and dominate the people there.48 As previously noted, there
is still much controversy surrounding the origins of the Tutsi people. This
controversy stemmed in large part from the reaction of the Europeans who
first observed inter-ethnic relations among the groups.
Of all the peoples in the region, it was the Tutsi who b'ore the stron-
gest resemblance to the Europeans. Upon first seeing the Tutsi, the Germans
noted their height, the narrowness of their facial features and their lighter
complexion. 9 They also remarked on the nature of the social system, framing
it in familiar, European terms: the Tutsi were the aristocrats, the Hutu were
the commoners and the Twa were the pariahs.50 The fact that the Tutsi
45 Recent Violence in Burundi: What Should Be The US Response?, supra note
1. While the widespread interethnio killing that we witness today clearly was not in
evidence prior to the colonial era, there did exist ethnic awareness. Old Kirundi
proverb warn, "If you teach a Hutu to shoot a bow, he'll shoot an arrow into your
stomach," and "If you polish the teeth of a Tutsi, tomorrow he'll bite you." Catharine
Watson, The U.S. Committee for Refugees, Transition in Burundi: The Context For
A Homecoming, at 5 (1993).
47 LEMARCHAND, supra note 19, at 98, 476.
48 MAQuET, supra note 40, at 19.
49 Antoine Nyagaheng Mythes et Ideologies: Le Cas de l'Histoire du Peuplement
du Rwanda Ancien, Les Rlations Interethniques au Ruanda A la Lumi~re de
l'Agression d'Octobre 1990: Gen~se, Soubassements et Perspectives, (Editions
Universitaires du Ruanda, 1991) at 31.
50 MAQuET, supra note 40, at 10.
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looked vaguely Aryan in comparison to other ethnic groups, combined with
their superior socio-economic and political position, led the Germans to
conclude that the Tutsi were innately superior as well."
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there even arose in Euro-
pean academic circles what became known as the "Hamitic Myth." Reasoning
that the Tutsi must have migrated from somewhere to the north (Egypt,
Somalia or even Israel), the Europeans speculated that these people were in
fact descendants of the biblical tribes of Ham and were thus inheritors of a
culture far superior to the local Hutu or Twa. In reality, there is no evidence
whatsoever that the Tutsi are descendants of Abyssinians or Egyptians, or
even that they migrated from the north. There is also significant modem
nutritional evidence that the increased stature of the Tutsi has largely been a
result of their superior, milk-rich diet. 52 Further, by the time the Germans
had arrived in the final years of the 19th century, the area from Lake Victoria
to Lake Tanganyika represented a single, coherent cultural whole. The
people, tall and short, were all Bantu-speakers, and they all shared a common
religion.
Despite the existence of this cultural whole, the Germans, and after
them the Belgians, heavily relied on the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi to liaise
with the respective monarchies. Tutsi were given positions of power, prestige
and trust, and the colonists turned a blind eye to increasing Tutsi mistreat-
ment of their Hutu clients. The comments of R. Kandt, the first German
Resident du Rwanda in 1905, are indicative of the prevalent contempt the
Europeans had for the plight of the Hutu,
Les Wahutus se plaignent de l'oppression qu'ils doivent
subir et de leur privation totale de tout droit. A plusieurs
reprises je leur ai dit de se debrouiller eux-m~mes, je me
suis m~me un peu moqu6 d'eux en leur disent que eux, qui
sont 100 fois plus nombreux que les Watutsi savent
seulement grmir et se plaindre comme des femmes.53
European colonists and missionaries brought with them their own notions
51 Nyagahene, supra note 49, at 31.
52 Catha-ine Watson, Transition in Burundi: The Context for a Homecoming,
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES ISSUE PAPER, 5 (1993).
53 B. Lugan, Sources Ecrites Pouvant Servir i l'-istoire du Rwanda, 5 ETUDES
RwANDIsms 30 (1980).
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of race and superiority, and these could not help but impact upon how the
different ethnic groups regarded one another. Stereotypical qualities were
ascribed to the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa whereby the first group was described
as intelligent, refined and courageous leaders; the second as hardworking,
unmannerly and obedient laborers; and the last as gluttonous, lazy and un-
restrained hunters.' As J.J. Maquet notes, such socially accepted concep-
tions about inequality tend to become self-perpetuating and tyrannical,
because those who occupy the superior positions in most of the social rela-
tions in which they are involved, tend to develop a permanent authoritarian
behavior .... This leads to intolerance.55
The Belgian policy toward inter-ethnic relations in Ruanda-Urundi
was consistent with that of the Germans for roughly forty years. The Bel-
gians favored the Tutsi in the areas of education, politics, and economics.
In Rwanda, where favoritism was far more extreme, a greater number of
Hutu chiefs were replaced by Tutsi and education was for Tutsi only.
When independence loomed, however, the Belgian policies abruptly
changed. For years the Belgians had assured the Tutsi that they were the
born leaders, yet by the 1950s the Belgians began to suspect some Tutsi of
leftist leanings. This prompted the Belgians to switch their focus from
Tutsi to Hutu, since the latter were considered a better counterbalance to
communism.56 The Belgian policy was quite successful in inspiring resent-
ment among the Hutu, who challenged the status quo in both countries.
The Hutu challenge, however, resulted in majority rule in only Rwanda at
the time of independence.
C. Since Independence
The post-independence histories of Rwanda and Burundi read like
a manual on how to identify human rights abuses. The litany of massacres,
reprisals, genocides, and massive refugee flows defies description and has
been a constant source of instability in the region.
Rwanda's turbulence began in earnest in 1959, when the Hutu ma-
jority rose up against the Tutsi rulers and began a widespread campaign of
ethnic cleansing which lasted until 1961. After independence, another large
wave of violence swept the country in 1963, when Hutu killed an estimated
54 MAQUET, supra note 40, at 164.
5s Id. at 168.
56 Catharine Watson, Exile From Rwanda: Background To An Invasion, U.S.
COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES ISSUE PAPER, 4 (199 1).
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10,000 Tutsi, largely with Rwandan government complicity and even en-
couragement. 57
Burundi's post-independence suffering has been just as brutal. In
1972, inter-ethnic violence erupted and, while the details remain unclear,
most observers think the killings were precipitated by hardliner Hutu refu-
gees from the PALIPEHUTU movement who infiltrated into Burundi and
attacked Tutsi, killing between 10-15,000.5' The Tutsi then responded by
killing 100-200,000 Hutu in what seems to be a clear-cut case of geno-
cide.59 The pattern of violence and was clearly evidenced by the events of
1988, when, fearing violence on account of military manoeuvres, Hutu
launched a "preemptive" massacre of 2-3,000 Tutsi.6 The Tutsi-dominated
army then responded with the "retributive" killing of 5-10,000 Hutu. In
1991, reformatory liberalization programs instituted by the Tutsi leadership
from 1988 until 1991 ironically led to greater Hutu unrest. Once again the
cycle of Hutu attacking Tutsi, followed by Tutsi army reprisals, was set in
motion. Approximately 1,000 people died in the violence, mostly at the
hands of the army, and almost all of them Hutu. Finally, following the
assassination of Hutu President Ndadaye in 1993, there was widespread
killing of Tutsi by hardliner Hutu who were against any reconciliation with
the Tutsi, as well as by those Hutu loyal to Ndadaye.6"
Rarely has ethnicity been so effectively manipulated by the few to
influence the many as in Rwanda and Burundi. These two countries, and
the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa who live within their borders, together constitute
an almost archetypical example of the underlying causes of ethnic conflict.
Contrary to the attractive simplicity offered by some news accounts of mas-
sacres in which thousands die, such violence is not spontaneous or pro-
voked without design. Nor is it inevitable. The recent assassinations of the
Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi are cases in point. Whether responsibil-
57 Todd Shields, Invasion Stirs Tribal Tension in Rwanda: Government, Led by
Hutu, Rounding Up Minority Tutsi, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1990 at A23.
58 Catharine Watson, The Death of Democracy, 38 AFRICA REPORT 28 (1993).
59 Murder Within Sovereign Borders, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1988, at 20.
6 Id.
61 It is significant that during the abortive coup of 1993, the army remained loyal
to the government. This factor virtually insured that the coup would fail. It is
significant because, despite the move to a majority government in Burundi, Tutsi still
dominate the military forces. Burundi's army is one of the best equipped and trained
in Africa and it is ninety-five percent Tutsi, many of whom are members of the small
Hima subsect of the Tutsi tribe.
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ity lies with a small group of hardliner Hutu (a distinct probability),62 or
with the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front forces, the implication is the same:
a small group of individuals acted in a calculated manner to achieve a spe-
cific political end. Ethnic tensions had been effectively manipulated by
Habyarimana during his presidency, and they needed little fanning to ignite
anew. In fact, there is every reason to believe that hardliner Hutu in
Habyarimana's administration killed the President and then pointed the
finger at the Rwandan Patriotic Front, knowing full well such a move would
ignite Hutu violence against Tutsi.
Seen in this light, the explosion in Rwanda set along side the calm
in Burundi is easy to explain. Burundi's president was essentially an inci-
dental victim in the affair; it was never the aim of the Burundian govern-
ment to create inter-ethnic rifts among the populace, and the army remained
neutral. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hutu did not start massacuring
Tutsi by the thousand. This fact further discredits the racist notion that
ethnic violence in Rwanda (or Burundi) is something which the people are
compelled by their very nature to commit. Of course, this is not to say that
tensions do not currently exist in Burundi between Tutsi and Hutu. Tutsi
refugees have crossed the borderto where in huge numbers and some have
brought with them profound fear, mistrust and hatred of Hutu, whether
from Rwanda or Burundi. The situation in Burundi is therefore extremely.
tenuous, and should political agents choose to manipulate strained inter-
ethnic relations, Burundi too could very well explode.
The periodic ethnic clashes in Rwanda and Burundi are in some
ways akin to the war in the former Yugoslavia. None of these is a historic
conflict; each is a modem struggle for the future.63 There is an even more
tragic similarity between Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Burundi, however.
While ethnic hatred was clearly not the cause of these conflicts, it has cer-
tainly become a residual effect of them.
The preceding outlined briefly the political and inter-ethnic histo-
ries of Rwanda and Burundi. Both countries are now governed by majority
rule, yet both have legacies of minority domination. Burundi still has
strong state institutions which are controlled by the minority, whereas in
Rwanda, the minority is underrepresented in state institutions but powerful
62 Deborah Scroggins, Power Grab Put Rwanda in Turmoil, THE ATLANTA
JOtrRNAL AND CONSTIUTMON, Apr. 17, 1994 at 4.
63 Misha Glenny, remarks at the "Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism," An
Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC) symposium at
Tufts University (Mar. 2-6, 1994).
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in religious and economic sectors.' As with any ethnic conflict, the chal-
lenge in Rwanda and Burundi lies not in containing the violence so much as
in addressing its root causes. In both Rwanda and Burundi, the difficult
questions of minority versus majority rule and group versus individual




As the recent massacres of Tutsi in both Rwanda and Burundi reveal,
the legal provisions in place for human rights protection and cooperative
governance are clearly inadequate to contain the enormous ethnic and political
pressures within both countries. Rwanda and Burundi are unique in that
while they resemble other notorious African examples of minority rule, such
as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, they do so outside of the colonial
context. This presents singular problems as both countries seek recourse to
domestic and international legal provisions for insuring completion of the
transition from minority to majority rule.
Just as "race," "ethnicity" and "tribe" are virtually impossible terms
to define, so too is that of "minority." In the past, international organizations
such as the League of Nations and the United Nations have attempted to
provide for the rights of minorities. Yet they only approximated a definition
of the groups they sought to protect, while trying to avoid an overly general
definition which would include virtually everyone.
The League of Nations sought to protect the rights of minorities,
particularly ethnic, linguistic and national groups, who lived in various parts
of Europe. The League members thus drafted a series of "minorities treaties"
after the conclusion of World War I. While these treaties offered the most
comprehensive civil, political and cultural rights to date, they did not contain
an explicit definition of the term "minority," rather referred to the "full and
complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants without distinction of
birth, nationality, language, race or religion."'65
64 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1993, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS].
6 The Polish Minorities Treaty, June 28, 1919, art. 2. in Protection ofLinguistic,
Racial and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations. 1927. I.B.2. (Geneva,
August, 1927).
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Following World War II, the United Nations rejected the League's
approach of focusing on the special rights of particular groups and instead
concentrated on protecting universal human rights enjoyed by all individuals.
66 Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains no special
provisions concerning minorities. Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966) applies to "those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities exist," but again, does not define exactly
what it envisions a minority to be.
67
Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the concept of "minor-
ity", as well as the most precise definition of the term, has been offered by
Professor Franco Capotorti, who, in 1971, was appointed a Special Rappor-
teur on Minorities by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities.' Capotorti submitted his final report to the
Sub-Commission in 1977, and employed within it the following definition of
a "minority":
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of
a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members --
being nationals of the State -- possess ethnic, religious or
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of
the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of soli-
darity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions,
religion or language.69
More recent attempts to clarify the concept of minorities have attempted to
downplay the numerical requirement and focus instead on the nondominance
66 Edward Lawson, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HuMAN RIGHTS 1069 (1991).
67 Although, Article 27 implicitly would appear to give individuals certain rights
in relation to his community if he is in conflict with it. The Article's use of the
language, "...in which ... minorities exist ..." also seems to exclude new arrivals such
as migrants and immigrants. The restrictive reference to "ethnic, religious, or linguis-
tic" qualifiers would also appear to exclude indigenous peoples.
68 Thomberry, supra note 8, at 152.
69 Id. at 167.
[Vol. II
POWER ETHNICIZED
component. For example, Jay Sigler defines a "minority" as:
[a]ny group category of people who can be identified by a
sizable segment of the population as objects for prejudice or
discrimination or who, for reasons of deprivation, require
the positive assistance of the state. A persistent
nondominant position of the group in political, social, and
cultural matters is the common feature of the minority."
This definition makes the significant leap from numerical nondominance to
political, social, and cultural nondominance. The attempt to incorporate an
element of "powerlessness" into the definition of a "minority" is, however
certain to blur any meaningful distinction between "minority" and "majority",
and to confuse the concept of minority rights with that of self-determination.71
Indeed, if Sigler's more inclusive definition were applied to Rwanda
and Burundi, the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa would each qualify as a "minor-
ity". The numerically superior group, the Hutu, would qualify given its long
history of discriminatory treatment at the hands of the European colonial
powers and of the Tutsi. Also, despite advances in Burundi since the advent
of majority rule, Hutu are still underrepresented in education, civil service,
and the armed forces. The Tutsi, too, would qualify, although the case for
classifying them as a "minority" under Sigler's definition is a far less contro-
versial one than it is for the Hutu. The Tutsi's numerical inferiority and the
severe backlash discrimination they now face in Rwanda and Burundi as Hutu
in both countries demand fewer Tutsi in positions of power and wealth, would
clearly qualify them as "objects for prejudice or discrimination."72 Finally,
the Twa are the clearest, least controversial case of a "minority" by any
definition, restrictive or otherwise. The Twa are numerically inferior to the
Hutu and the Tutsi, and remain completely marginalized in social and politi-
cal life. In sum, it is clear from the preceding discussion, that a definition of
"minority" which includes Burundi's and Rwanda's minority and majority
groups alike, is too wide.
For the purposes of this paper, a variation on Capotorti's more
restrictive definition will be used, whereby the term "minority" connotes a
nondominant group of less than fifty percent of a given population, which
70 JAY A. SIGLER, MINORTrY RIGHTS, A CoMPARATIvE ANALYSIS 5 (1983).
71 HURSTHANNUM, AuToNoMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 50 (1990).
72 SIGLER, supra note 70, at 5.
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recognizes itself as united by some objective characteristics such as race,
religion, language, nationhood, culture, or ethnicity, and wishes to continue its
common traditions. Self-recognition is a key element, as are numerical
inferiority and nondominance." Under this definition, the Tutsi and the Twa
are the only ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi which qualify, at the
present time, as minorities.
B. Group v. Individual Rights
The debate over group versus individual rights goes to the heart of
how best to protect basic human rights. Proponents of group or minority
rights argue that it is only by singling out a group which has been the object
of discriminatory treatment in the past that the playing field can be levelled so
that all citizens enjoy their basic human rights in relative equality. 4 Others
insist that group rights are of dubious legality in that they grant to groups
special rights which are by their definition not enjoyed by all individuals.75
By definition, the argument goes, minority rights are not applicable to all and
therefore cannot be considered universal human rights. Another argument
against the concept of minority rights is that, if carried too far, the attempt to
protect these rights risks being applied ad absurdum. Every individual, at
some level, is a member of some minority. Definitions become problematic
when group distinctions are made minutely rather than broadly.
What also prevents easy classification of minority issues is the fact
that the demands of minorities vary. Some ethnic, linguistic or religious
groups seek simple equality with the majorities in their states, and some seek
active governmental policies of rectification to redress past grievances.76 As
demands by minorities within states vary, so too do the international re-
sponses to them. States have traditionally been reluctant to bring the minority
issues of other states into the international arena, since these problems are
perceived as being "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"" of the states
73 THORNBERRY, supra note 8 at 165; Capotorti regarded the element of common
ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics and traditions as essential to the
definition of a minority. The criteria of nondominance and group desire to preserve
traditions, in his view, were more contentious elements.
74 Tribal Feeling, THE ECONOMiST, Dec. 25, 1993-Jan. 7, 1994, at 13.
75 Id.
76 LAWSON, supra note 66, at 1070.
" U.N. CHARTER, art.2, 7: "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
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in which the minorities exist The United Nations too has traditionally chosen
to protect the rights of all citizens within a state through the promotion of
individual civil and political rights rather than through minority rights.'
Clearly, the issue of group versus individual rights is a difficult and
often emotional one. While it may be possible for the purposes of this paper
to fix upon an approximate definition of "minority," it is far more difficult to
determine whether the Tutsi and Twa minorities in Rwanda and Burundi
would be more effectively protected via individual or group human rights.
Equally difficult is the question of how to ensure that the historically disad-
vantaged, yet majority, Hutu also enjoy their civil and political rights, some-
thing which is not always apparent. Such difficulties are too great to be
resolved by group rights alone and they point to a fundamental inadequacy of
the concept of groups rights to comprehensively address the problems facing
Rwanda and Burundi.
This is not to say that the entire concept of minority rights is flawed.
Rather it suggest merely that minority rights are probably not the most
effective means through which to address the social imbalances in Rwanda
and Burundi. Minority rights are typically most effective when they provide
a means for a historically disadvantaged group to exercise its own culture,
speak its own language and practice its own religion. In Rwanda and Bu-
rundi, however, all ethnic groups share an approximate culture and identical
religion and language. The historically disadvantaged group in both coun-
tries, moreover, happens to be the majority, further muting the relevance of
minority rights.
Given the multitudinous nature of the historical and political circum-
stances of Rwanda and Burundi, and given the fact the minority and majority
alike need protection, minority rights are relevant when speaking of protecting
the Tutsi and the Twa. Nonetheless, minority rights are essentially unhelpful
when speaking of a comprehensive solution. It is clear that the Tutsi and the
Twa in Rwanda and Burundi need protection, just as it is clear that the Hutu
in Burundi need to play a greater role in the government and the military. But
protection and participation would be best effected through the promotion of
individual human rights and through changes in domestic law and policy to
insure greater participation of, and less systemic discrimination against, all
groups.
domestiejurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter..."
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C. Domestic
Majorities and minorities alike usually seek two things above all
others: to protect their existence and identity, and to effectively participate in
society and governance. The dual goals of protection and participation are
most efficiently realized in a state's domestic constitutional arrangements and
in its social policies (on education and employment, especially). Given the
frequency of inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda and Burundi, and given the still
prevalent institutional discrimination against Tutsi in Rwanda and Hutu in
Burundi, the constitutional protection of human rights and provisions for
representative are unquestionably inadequate. Of course, a healthy civil
service and a strong, independent judiciary are also needed to insure those
protections and provisions are meaningful.
On June 10, 1991, Rwanda promulgated a new, amended text of its
constitution, the first article of which now declares the country to be a "demo-
cratic, social and sovereign Republic."78 The new constitution provides for
the introduction of political parties and of separation of powers between the
executive, legislature and judiciary, and has resulted in a mixed coalition
government in which the president still retains considerable power.79 Another
feature of the amended text is the creation of the position of prime minister.8"
Suffrage is universal and officials are elected by an absolute majority of
votes.8 ' There is no constitutional system of weighted voting. Of obvious
concern to the drafters of the constitution was the volatile combination of
ethnicity, political parties and the military. The attempt to divorce politics
from the military is evident in the prohibition on members of the military
from joining political parties. Despite this prohibition, however, the military
remains dominated by Hutu affiliated with the Republican Movement for
Democracy and Development (MRND).
Likewise, despite the constitutional prohibition against ethnic dis-
crimination, 2 a policy is still in place which requires all individuals to carry
78 CONsTITUrTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993).
79 Subha Ramanathan, Commentary on the Republic of Rwanda, CONSTrLONS
OF THE CoUNTRms OF THE WORLD: REPUBLIC OF RWANDA (1993).
8 0 RWANDA CONST. art. 44 creates the position of Prime Minister and dictates that
that individual be appointed by the President of the Republic.
81 RWANDA CONST. art. 40.
82 RWANDA CONST. art. 16 provides that, "[a]ll citizens shall be equal in the eyes
of the law, without any discrimination, especially in respect to race, color, origin,
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identity cards indicating their ethnic origin.83 The 1993 Arusha Peace Accord
(between the government and the RPF), called for an end to this policy, but in
practice it remains in force. Prior to the advent of the present coalition
government, a quota system limited Tutsi access to education, training, and
government employment. This ethnic quota system provides access and
employment to members of ethnic groups in proportion to their numbers, and
insures the "virtual absence" of Tutsi from all security forces.84 As for the
Twa, they are not a part of the ethnic quota system, and therefore neither gain
nor lose from it. They remain isolated from opportunity and representation in
all spheres.
In Burundi, the political scene is currently one of paralysis.8" At-
tempts to seperate politics from ethnicity have met with mixed results, and the
progress toward democracy is still tentative. The conciliatory policies set in
motion by Ndadaye have been placed in limbo while Burundi awaits the
filling of its leadership vacuum. Political parties are now legal, but
FRODEBU, a still chiefly Hutu party, dominates the National Assembly, with
sixty-five out of eighty-one seats; UPRONA, the Tutsi-controlled and for-
merly sole legal party, is the next most dominant group.86 Under Article 57
of the Bur ndian Constitution, political parties are forbidden to identify
themselves "in form, action, or any other manner," with a particular ethnic
group, yet in practice, ethnic affiliation of political parties is common.87
Burundi's Constitution, like Rwanda's, also provides no explicit formula for
weighted voting along ethnic lines; but instead grants the right of proportional
representation based on the number of people in each prefecture, not on their
ethnicity.' The civil society President Ndadaye tried to engender is probably
the sole means by which politics and ethnicity could be separated,89 but,
ethnic background, clan, sex, opinion, religion or social status."
83 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 64, at 233.
84 Id.
85 NDI Report, supra note 37, at 1.
86 Id. at 5.
87 BURUNDI CONST., art 57, March 9, 1991, promulgated March 13, 1992; see
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, supra
note 78; article 55 also provides that political parties must "respect, protect and
consolidate national unity [and] ... prohibit intolerance, ethnicism, regionalism,
xenophobia, and recourse to violence in any form."
88 BURUNDI CONsT. arts. 3, 61, 97, 103.
89 Country Report on Burundi, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNrT, 4th Quarter,
1993, at 27.
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unfortunately, this nascent civil society, like the political scene in general, is
in a state of limbo.
As concerns the executive branch of government, there is in place a
quota system under which the ruling FRODEBU government grants forty
percent of government ministerial posts to Upronists. This is not a constitu-
tional arrangement, rather a political settlement reached between FRODEBU
and UPRONA.
Despite the prohibition against discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, or social status, and governmental attempts to
remedy such bias, widespread discrimination against Hutu and Twa in Bu-
rundi continues. Hutu are still effectively excluded from careers in the mili-
tary, judiciary and civil service, at least partially due to blocked access to
secondary education.91 The Twa remain completely marginalized, without
access to schools, government services, or health care.
There are no provisions to "level the playing field" in either Rwanda's
or Burundi's Constitutions; distinction of any kind based on ethnicity is
prohibited. While this, in theory, prevents discrimination against members of
groups, in practice it has prevented the amelioration of entrenched systemic
discrimination, whether it be of the minority or the majority. As the anteced-
ent discussion illustrates, the domestic legal and political provisions in place
in Rwanda and Burundi are inadequate to provide for the necessary protection
and participation of all ethnic groups. The international provisions in place
are similarly inadequate. They do not include any additional tangible safe-
guards and do little to shed light on how to harmonize conflicting rights and
interests.
D. International
There are several pertinent international conventions for the protec-
tion of group interests, some of which, in theory, provide a means of enforce-
ment. Among these are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (1948), 2 the International Covenants on Civil and
90 NDI Report, supra note 37, at 6. Although this arrangement is not a provision
for Tutsi representation, rather for opposition representation, implicitly the effect is
ethnic as well as political since Upronists are largely Tutsi.
91 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 64 at 30.
92 Burundi is not a signatory.
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Political Rights,' and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 94 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (1966), s and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(1981). 96
The Genocide Convention defines "genocide" as the commission of
murder, serious bodily or mental harm, and other grave offenses, with the
intent "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group ..... 9 Enforcement provisions are contained in Article 6, which
prescribes that persons charged with genocide shall be tried under the domes-
tic law of the place of the offense, or by an international criminal tribunal,
should one ever be instituted. Under Article 9, disputes between Contracting
Parties relating to the Convention are to be submitted to the International
Court of Justice "at the request of the parties to the dispute." This language
has provoked heated debate over whether third parties have standing to bring
Contracting Parties before the ICJ on charges of genocide, or whether such
action is limited to signatories to the Convention who are also parties to the
dispute over the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the Convention.
This debate is potentially relevant, given that Rwanda is a signatory to the
Convention while Burundi is not, and given the apparent commission of
genocide in both countries. On the other hand, there has never been a case of
a state, contracting party or otherwise, submitting to the ICJ a dispute regard-
ing the Convention, aside from the lone recent example of Bosnia filing
against Serbia.
As discussed above, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights contains a reference to ethnic (and religious or linguistic)
minorities, yet the real enforcement mechanism in that treaty is found in the
Optional Protocol, to which neither Rwanda nor Burundi is a signatory.
Absent the interstate complaint procedure outlined in Article 41, the Cove-
nant lacks any true enforcement provisions for the protection of ethnic
groups.
Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
93 Both States have signed the Covenant, but neither has ratified the Optional
Protocol, granting to the Human Rights Committee the authority to examine interstate
complaints made under Article 41 of the Covenant.
94 Both States have ratified the Covenant.
95 Both States are signatories.
-' Both States have ratified the Charter.
97 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
1948, art. 2.
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Cultural Rights provides that parties must undertake to guarantee the rights of
all peoples to social, economic and cultural development without regard to
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.' Again, however, there is no
enforcement mechanism for States which fail to "undertake measures" to
guarantee these rights. Moreover, the Article 1 references to self-determina-
tion are unhelpful to the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi, since that term, and
all its implications, are most resonant within the colonial context.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination defines "racial discrimination" as
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recogni-
tion, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life."
Under this definition, current societal and institutional discrimination against
the Hutu in Burundi, against the Tutsi in Rwanda, and against the Twa
everywhere, would undoubtedly qualify as racial discrimination within the
meaning of the Convention. The Convention also calls on states to protect
comprehensive rights of access to education, health service, and employment.
Again, however, the language of the Convention is aspiratory and the enforce-
ment provisions have proven weak. Under Article 9, states have an obliga-
tion to submit reports, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) has the authority to make suggestions and recom-
mendations to the General Assembly of the United Nations upon examination
of the reports. Thus far, however, CERD has not fulfilled its considerable
potential, in large part due to underfunding.
Finally, the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
does not refer to "ethnic groups" or "minorities", only to "peoples," and there
is much debate as to whether this means "nations", "races" or "groups". The
Banjul Charter is remarkable in that it simultaneously manages to say a great
deal without saying very much. The first 19 articles all contain clawback
provisions allowing states to derogate in cases of emergency from the sub-
98 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, art. 2[2].
99 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrini-
nation, 1966, art. 1.
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stance of the protections contained therein. Likewise, references to domina-
tion and self-determination are made solely within the context of colonial-
ism."° The Charter is unique in combining civil and political, and social,
economic and cultural rights, and in prescribing rights as well as duties.'0 '
Nonetheless, the enforcement mechanism whereby states or non-state actors
file complaints for review by a commission, has proven to be restrictive,
conservative, and extremely political in practice."°
The international legal framework for the protection and effective
participation of ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi is largely aspiratory in
nature. The various regimes created via international covenants and conven-
tions also lack the strong enforcement mechanisms required to persuade states
to comply with the treaty provisions. Some suggestions on how to change the
domestic legal landscape, as well as that of the regional and international
scenes, are outlined below.
V. PRESCRIPTiVE LEGAL ANALYSIS
To resolve ethnic conflicts, one must first address systemic human
rights abuses. There must be more than nominal equality before the law;
there must also be institutional safeguards in place. There must be effective
means for minority and majority participation in politics, education and civil
administration. As always, however, the challenge is not discerning what to
do, but how to do it. Settling on the means is inevitably more difficult than
on the ends to be achieved.
The complexities of Rwanda and Burundi do not lend themselves to
most of the popular solutions to ethnic conflict which are proffered by aca-
demics and policy makers. Ethnic partition, the redrawing of boundaries,
autonomy and secession are each inadequate or simply improper courses of
action for Rwanda and Burundi. The history and culture of the ethnic groups
in these two countries are inextricably linked, and so are their futures. While
there are regions in each country which contain concentrated ethnic pockets,
the phenomenon of secessionary ethnic enclaves is not in evidence. Also
10 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981, arts. 19 and 20.
101 Justice Ebua Lihau, Comments on the Banjul Charter, 11 HRI Reporter,
Nov., 1986, at 13.
102 Dr. Abdullahi An-Na'im, Executive Director of Africa Watch: Human Rights
in Africa, Informal Talk Given at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in
Medford, Mass. (Apr. 13, 1994).
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absent are calls for the unification of the two countries. As similar as
Rwanda and Burundi may be demographically, historically, culturally and
otherwise, these two countries apparently want to remain distinct, whole and
independent from each other.
The question thus becomes, one of how to reconcile conflicting
rights. Is it better to seek protection and participation through domestic law
or through international law?
A. Domestic
A prime motivator of inter-ethnic discrimination in Rwanda is Hutu
fear of Tutsi returning to a position of dominance, while a prime motivator of
inter-ethnic discrimination in Burundi is Tutsi fear of sharing the plight of
their brethren in Rwanda. Such embattled minorities are not unique to
Rwanda and Burundi. It is useful, therefore, to examine the constitutional
safeguards"°3 afforded to minorities by other countries which have effected
the transition from minority to majority rule and have sought the means by
which to protect and include minorities which were overwhelmingly outnum-
bered and largely despised. Three African countries which fit these criteria
are Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The first has managed to safe-
guard the rights of its white minority fairly well for over thirteen years; the
second and third cases are far more recent and therefore less conclusive. All
are different in at least two major respects from Rwanda and Burundi: the
ruling minority and ruled majority were of different races, and the domination
was colonial in form. Although these differences limit the usefulness of the
comparison, they do not negate it completely.
1. Zimbabwe. The Lancaster House Constitutional Conference of
1979 attempted to negotiate a workable post-independence government for
Rhodesia by addressing the concerns of the white minority, the black major-
ity, and the British (the former colonial power). The resulting constitution
contained ceasefire provisions to end the guerrilla war for independence,
created a highly centralized, unitary state loosely based on a British Parlia-
mentary model, and provided for a provisional interim period of British
103 Constitutional "safeguards for minorities" are a narrower concept than that of
"minority rights." The former speaks only to the protection and participation of
minorities on par with the rest of society, while the latter includes, inter alia, the
specialized rights of a historically disadvantaged group to practice its religion, enjoy
its culture, and speak its language in addition to what is afforded the rest of society.
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administration until elections.1°4 The Zimbabwean constitution is unique
among African constitutions in several respects: it clearly defines the term
"discriminatory;" it establishes a distinction between "common rolls" and
"white rolls;" and it provides for a strong, independent judiciary.
Article 23 [2] defines treatment or legislation as... "discriminatory"
if... as a result of that law or treatment, persons of a particular description
by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour or creed are prejudiced:
(a) by being subjected to a condition, restriction or disability to which per-
sons of another such description are not made subject; or
(b) by the according to persons of another such description of a privilege or
advantage which is not accorded to persons of the first-mentioned descrip-
tion; and the imposition of that condition, restriction or disability or the
according of that privilege or advantage is wholly or mainly attributable to the
description by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour or creed of
the person concerned.
Discrimination, therefore, includes either disadvantage to a group, advantage
to another, or both. Zimbabwes' constitution proscribes discrimination of any
kind for any reason, 105 and forbids the passage of any provision that is
discriminatory either in its nature or in its effect.'0
Also unique to the Zimbabwean Constitution are its legislative
provisions calling for the House Assembly to be composed of mixed mem-
bers, eighty percent of which are elected by voters from common rolls, and
twenty percent of which are elected by voters on the white roll.'0 7 These rolls
are formed from different constituencies, the limits of which are defined by a
Delimitation Commission."~s When determining constituencies, the Commis-
sion must take into account, inter alia, the geographical distribution of voters
registered on the common rolls or the white roll, and the community of
interest as between voters registered on the common rolls or the white roll.'09
This arrangement for representation in the legislature is not based on absolute
104 Kenneth Rush, Commentary on Zimbabwe, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD: ZIMBABwE (Sept 1987).
105 Znm. CoNsT. art. 23[1][b].
106 Id. at art. 23[1][a].
'0 Id. at art. 38.
... Id. at art. 60.
'09 Id. at art. 60[c][d].
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group percentages (whites comprise between one and three percent of the
population), but rather reflect an effort to reassure the white populace that its
interests and civil and political rights will be insured.
A strong, independent judiciary is likewise an essential element to
any society hoping to develop a legal tradition. In Zimbabwe, as in many
African states, a strong, central executive damaged the system of public
accountability to a great degree. While the Zimbabwean judiciary has shown
considerable independence when faced with political cases, a culture of
authoritarianism has left its imprint."'
The view that Zimbabwe's constitution is a positive example to be
emulated is by no means universal. Currently, the country is struggling with
land reform issues between white landholders and black claimants. Many feel
that the unitary system contained in the Lancaster House Constitution was ill-
suited for a newly independent heterogeneous society in which the competi-
tion for power was, and is, intense."' Whether or not this is valid, Zimbabwe
still offers some useful lessons for Rwanda and Burundi as they seek ways in
which balance the interests of conflicting groups.
The Constitutions of Rwanda and Burundi could benefit from Zimba-
bwe's clear, comprehensive definition of "discrimination" which includes both
disability and privilege components. Also beneficial would be stronger, more
independent judiciaries, for the rule of law is impossible to engender without
a disinterested judicial branch. Zimbabwe's system of weighted voting is
more problematic but still worth examining. It is significant that following
independence, Zimbabwe experienced no large-scale backlash violence
against whites. How much of this was due to constitutional provisions and
110 NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 59
(1988).
III JEFFREY DAVIDOW, A PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE LANCASTER HOUSE
CONFERENCE ON RHODESIA 13 (1984). Davidow speculates that a federalist system
would have been more appropriate and enduring for such a heterogeneous society.
He implies that if a federalist model were used, Zimbabwe's current transition to
multiparty democracy would not be as difficult as it is today. Rend Lemarchand takes
the opposite view, at least with respect to Burundi, and argues that, "the merits of
federalism as a strategy for conciliation are largely irrelevant to the Burundi situation
.... In theory the argument carries conviction, but where none of the federal units are
ethnically homogeneous ... one wonders how devolution could effectively mitigate
conflict" Rend Lemarchand, Burundi in Comparative Perspective, in THE POLITICS
OF ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION: CASE STUDIES OF PROTRACTED ETHNIC CON-
FLicTs 169, (John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds.,1993).
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how much to the colonial element is uncertain. The fact that Zimbabwean
independence was a self-determinative movement from white, colonial,
minority rule, to black, indigenous, majority rule, limits its usefulness as an
analogy to Rwanda and Burundi. In Zimbabwe, there was no colonial power
to incite ethnic hatred between majority and minority; rather the colonial
power was a central character which subsequently remained on the scene.
Nevertheless, if the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi were guaranteed a
certain percentage of seats in the National Assembly, this might lessen their
fears of discrimination and violence at the hands of the Hutu, and convince
them to invest in real structural changes granting greater Hutu participation in
traditionally Tutsi-dominated spheres. This arrangement might convince RPF
rebels in Rwanda that Tutsi interests are represented, and it may convince still
powerful Tutsi in Burundi that "Hutuization" does not spell the end of the
Tutsi people. As for the Twa, any system of representation, however mini-
mal, would be an improvement on the present situation.
2. Namibia. Namibia's experience is akin to that of Zimbabwe's in
that it too moved from minority to majority rule within a colonial and racial
context. Like Zimbabwe, Namibia also provides a useful precedent for
accommodating conflicting interests. Although the country only became
independent in 1990, it did so peacefully and has remained calm during the
intervening years. Namibia resembles Rwanda and Burundi in that the
majority/minority ratio is eighty-five percent to fifteen percent. Of course,
Namibia is sparsely populated compared to Rwanda and Burundi; it is over
fifteen times the size of the latter two countries combined, yet its population
is only one thirteenth that of Rwanda's and Burundi's combined." 2
Namibia's constitution, which came into force upon independence on
March 20, 1990, contains most of the relevant human rights norms and
references several international human rights treaties in force." 3 Article 10 of
the constitution prohibits discrimination of any kind based on sex, race, color,
ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status. An individuating
feature of the document is the "affirmative action" provision, contained in
Article 23[2]. This provision states,
112 COUNTRY REPORTS FOR BURUNDI, NAMIBIA, AD RWANDA, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 4th Quarter, 1993.
113 Albert Blaustein, Commentary, CONsTrrtrIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD: REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA (1990).
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[n]othing contained in Article 10 hereof shall prevent Parliament
from enacting legislation providing directly or indirectly for the
advancement of persons within Namibia who have been socially,
economically, or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory
laws or practices, or for the implementation of policies and
programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or educational
imbalances in Namibian society arising out of past discriminatory
laws or practices, or for achieving a balanced structuring of the
public service, the police force, the defence force and the prison
service.
While this provision, does not explicitly call for measures to "level the play-
ing field," makes clear that such affirmative action policies are not considered
discriminatory within the meaning of Article 10. It is interesting that the term
"minority" is deliberately avoided so that this provision can be read to apply
to minority and majority alike. Clearly, the drafters had in mind the black
majority, a historically disadvantaged group.
Were such a provision written into Rwanda's constitution, the effect
might well be to pave the way to increased access of Tutsi to education, the
public service, the police force, and the military. In Burundi, the article would
do the same for the disenfranchised Hutu. Significantly, however, Article
23 [2] does not provide any specific affirmative action programs to redress
discrimination. It simply guarantees that such action, if taken, would be legal.
Aside from this unique feature of Namibia's constitution, the docu-
ment takes the view that human rights are protected and exercised through the
individual, not the group. There are no weighted voting provisions and no
references to special protections for minorities; The Namibian Constitution,
like the Zimbabwean Constitution, seeks to guarantee the participation of the
majority and the protection of the minority. It simply does so in a slightly
different way. In Namibia, the twin goals of protection and participation are
achieved by combining constitutional "affirmative action" provisions with
individual human rights norms, while in Zimbabwe, this is done through a
combination of weighted voting provisions and individual human rights
norms.
3. South Africa. The constitution for the new South Africa is still in
the making, therefore any prescriptive value of this example is necessarily
qualified. South Africa, like Zimbabwe and Namibia before it, is moving
from a white minority government to a majority black government. It, too, is
struggling to find ways to convince the majority that representation is finally
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a reality, while at the same time reassuring the minority that its rights will be
also protected.
The old system vested power in the executive and in the parliament,
which was split into three houses: white (178 seats), mixed race (eighty-five
seats), and Indian (forty-five seats)."' The Parliament had the power to
amend the constitution by a majority and was free from judicial review.
Under the proposed legislative structure, however, the parliament is reduced
to two houses: the National Assembly (400 seats elected by proportional
party representation), and the Senate (ninety seats elected by provincial
legislatures). The new system vests lawmaking power in the parliament,
charges it with the responsibility of electing a new president and drafting a
permanent constitution, and allows it to amend the constitution by a majority.
A hopeful sign that violent political fractionalization along ethnic
lines such as that in Rwanda and Burundi will not develop in South Africa, is
the fact that political parties are
springing up everywhere and are mixing race, religion and fringe causes.' 15
In short, political parties are dividing along ideological rather than ethnic
lines. In this, there is an important example for Rwanda and Burundi.
Whatever course the new South Africa takes, its rulers must address
the fears of whites and the expectations of blacks. Reforms need to be
completed in education, taxation, land ownership and the police forces, in
order to boost the living standards and the representation of blacks in these
institutions. On the other hand, whites need to be reassured that the reform
policies will not be patently discriminatory or arbitrary.
4. Other Models of Minority Representation. One controversial
concept for minority representation which is currently attracting attention in
the United States is that of "cumulative voting." Traditionally, the rallying
cry of democracies has been, "one person, one vote." Cumulative voting turns
that maxim on its head and instead allocates each voter a bundle of votes
which can then be distributed among candidates as desired. For example, in
an election where fourteen candidates are vying for seven seats, each voter is
given the choice of casting one vote for each candidate, seven votes for one
candidate, or some variation between the two extremes." 6 In areas of the
114 Afier 300 Years, Blacks Vote in a South African Election, N.Y. Tams, Apr.
27, 1994, at Al, A8.
"' Id. atA8.
16 David Van Biema, One Person, Seven Votes, TIME, Apr. 25 1994, at 42-43.
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United States where cumulative voting is established,'" the system has
resulted in greater representation of minorities, whether they be black or
white. 118
Another interesting and perhaps imitable arrangement is that of
Mauritius. There, the "best loser" system provides for most members of its'
parliament to be elected through a simple majority of votes, but reserves eight
seats for the eight most popular losing candidates from "underrepresented
communities. ""9 In practice, this has meant greater representation of minor-
ity interests on a partially proportional basis. 2 °
In sum, Rwanda and Burundi need some way to insure majority
participation and minority protection. Political parties must be divided along
ideological, rather than ethnic lines. There needs to be more competition at
all levels in order to reduce the impact of ethnicity on politics. This means
more grassroots movements, evolving into political parties. Civil society, of
course, needs nurturing to become a force commensurate with the military,
and this is best accomplished through equal access to education and to em-
ployment.
Also important, and often overlooked, is the problem of development.
The role of overpopulation and resource depletion in Rwanda's and Burundi's
woes should not be underestimated. When competition for resources is fierce,
emotions are more easily stirred against "the Other," who then becomes a
convenient scapegoat for society's ills.' Overpopulation has the added
complexity of being a politicized issue. Members of historically persecuted
groups are naturally suspicious of any initiative to lower population growth.
Yet some measures clearly need to be taken to control the rate of population
growth and to raise the standard of living. Focusing on the developmental
aspect of the inter-ethnic relations in Rwanda and Burundi then is of para-
mount importance in any long-term domestic solutions.
B. International
117 These are Chilton County, Alabama; Alamogordo, New Mexico; and Peoria,
Illinois.
118 Van Biema, supra note 116, at 43.
119 THE PREcARious BALANCE: STATE AND SoCrETY iN AmR/cA, (Naomi Chazan
& Donald Rothchild, eds., 1988) at 239.
120 Id.
121 Paul Berman, The Other and the Almost the Same, TIE NEw YORKER, Feb.
28, 1994, at 6I-71.
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As we have seen through the preceding examination of current
international mechanisms in place, the arrangements for minority and major-
ity participation and protection in Rwanda and Burundi are largely aspiratory
in nature and lack enforcement provisions. Part of the problem is a lack of
any sort of regional focus. In light of this deficiency, one possibility is to
strengthen the Banjul Charter to resemble an African version of a successfully
functioning regional system, such as that instituted by the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Also desirable, would be a set
of principles similar to those contained within the CSCE's Copenhagen
Document on minorities. i
One suggestion, however. Even though the European system offers
an instructive model applicable to the Rwvandan and Burundian situations, it
does focus exclusively on minorities. This is problematic given the fact that
exclusive focus on minorities is not what Rwanda and Burundi need. There-
fore, in light of the inadequacy of the concept of minority rights to encompass
all of Rwanda's and Burundi's challenges, it would be more germane to
substitute the term "minorities" with that of "historically disadvantaged
groups," when discussing the protections, rights and enforcement mechanisms
of the European system. By substituting the term "historically disadvantaged
groups," the technical definition of "minority" can be avoided, without losing
the very applicable substance of the protective provisions included in these
documents.
The CSCE has proven an effective regional forum for political
dialogue."2 The Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE (1990), contains a comprehensive set of principles calling for states to
adopt special measures, where necessary, to ensure that persons belonging to
national minorities are able to use their languages, have equal access to
education, and participate politically. 3 Article 33 of the document provides
that states
will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of
national minorities on their territory and create conditions for the
122 Kevin Boyle, Europe: The Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the European
Communiy, in GuIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 134 (Hurst
Hannum ed., 1992).
123 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305
(1990).
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promotion of that identity. They will take the necessary measures to
that effect after due consultations, including contacts with organiza-
tions or associations of such minorities, in accordance with the
decision-making procedures of each State.
The provisions, especially as to political participation, are vague, and leave
wide discretion to individual states, however the language of "will protect,"
rather than, "shall undertake to protect," is an emphatic improvement over
most international human rights documents. In addition, the CSCE arrange-
ment also affords States the opportunity to critique the adherence of other
participating states to the obligations of the Conference. Thus, the treatment
a state affords its national minorities may be brought to the attention of an
international forum.
In its Report of the Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, dated
July 19, 1991, the CSCE stated that Article 31 of the Copenhagen Document
requires participating states to take measures to prevent discrimination
against individuals on the basis of belonging, or not belonging, to national
minorities;" This certainly has positive implications for Rwanda and Bu-
rundi, where discrimination has often resulted from the lack defining national
minorities. Also relevant to the Rwandan and Burundian situations is the
Report's recommendation that an international mechanism for the monitoring
and mediation of minority/majority relations within participating states be
instituted."z  Such permanent bilateral or regional mixed commissions
envisioned by the Report would be helpful within the context of Rwanda and
Burundi, where there has been neither a regional nor an interstate policy
regarding the protection of national minorities.
Also interesting is the CSCE Declaration and Decisions from the
Helsinki Summit; 26 The document calls for the establishment of a High
Commissioner for National Minorities who would assess, at the earliest
possible stage, the nature, parties and implications of any conflict involving
national minorities 27 The Commissioner would make visits with the notifi-
cation and compliance of the states concerned and employ quiet diplomacy,
124 CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, July 19, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1692 (1991).
125 Id. at 1699.
126 CSCE Declaration and Decisions from the Helsinki Summit, July 10, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 1385, 1396. (1992)
127 Id.at §I (b).
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with a view to a peaceful, political settlement. A section which shows partic-
ular promise, is that of reporting. The High Commissioner can receive and
collect information regarding the situation of national minorities and the role
of the parties involved, from any source whatsoever, so long as the communi-
cations are in writing and are not anonymous. 28 In this way, the process
bears some similarity to the Banjul Charter provisions regarding receipt of
information. 29
Copenhagen's blend of individual rights and group rights is a useful
example for Rwanda and Burundi. Although the principles are not legally
binding, they provide an example of a functioning regional approach to the
protection of historically disadvantaged groups. The idea of a High Commis-
sioner for National Minorities, vested with a preventive mandate and the
power to receive information about the situation of minorities from any
source, also has positive implications for the Central African region; although
the scope of such a Commissioner's mandate would have to widen beyond just
"minorities" to include all persecuted peoples. Altering the Banjul Charter or
even instituting an entirely separate system resembling that of the CSCE, is
worth considering. Although the past unwillingness of African States to open
their domestic relations to scrutiny could prove an insurmountable obstacle to
such a regional arrangement.
Finally, a word about multilateral intervention. The possibility of any
further U.N. Security Council protective initiatives to ameliorate the current
crisis in Rwanda (beyond the cursory peacekeeping force now in place), is
remote so long as the United States continues to view the crisis as lying
beyond the realpolitik notion of what constitutes U.S. national interests. The
United Nation's role therefore, is likely to be restricted to one of negotiation
and mediation. Some threshold bona fide willingness of the parties to reach
a settlement must be in evidence for negotiation to work, of course, but
multilateral efforts to engender such conciliation should not be underesti-
mated. In Rwanda, neither the political will, nor the multilateral effort, is
forthcoming at the present time.
CONCLUSION
The democratic problem in a plural society is to create political
institutions which give all the various groups the opportunity to
participate in decision-making, since only thus can they feel that
128 Id. at §23.
129 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 100, at art. 46.
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they are full members of a nation, respected by their more nu-
merous brethren, and owing equal respect to the national bond
which holds them together.
W. Arthur Lewis
Participation and protection for all are two essentials of any demo-
cratic process and both are lacking in Rwanda and Burundi. The cases of
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa offer some useful examples of states
which responded relatively well to the same sorts of intrastate pressures.
Rwanda and Burundi would do well to study how South Africa managed to
inspire ideologically defined political parties. They should also consider
imitating Zimbabwe's Constitutional definition of discrimination, or
Namibia's affirmative action provisions. And, they should avoid usage of the
term "minority" when trying to protect and proVide for historically disadvan-
taged groups, be they Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.
Thus far, Rwanda and Burundi have attempted to include minorities
at the ministerial level only, something which has clearly proven inadequate
in such strongly centralized states. More systemic changes are needed to
devolve powers and create more substantive legislatures and judiciaries.
Once this is accomplished, the next step will be to consider changes to the
parliamentary selection process. This could entail use of one (or a combina-
tion) of the models discussed, be it weighted voting, cumulative voting or the
best loser system.
In light of the domestic nature of most minority/majority conflicts,
international law is a limited means by which to effect protection or participa-
tion, and may therefore be most useful as a repository of standards and
principles. Also on an international level, a regional approach to the protec-
tion of human rights, akin to that of the CSCE, probably offers the greatest
promise for Rwanda and Burundi, although enforcement will remain a major
hurdle.
What is most important, above all, in considering the experiences of
Rwanda and Burundi, is to look beyond facial classifications. Only by
addressing the root causes of inter-ethnic conflict, can one hope to arrive at
durable solutions to end such conflict. It is crucial to remember that the
violence between Hutu and Tutsi is not historic (unless historic is defined
simply as subsequent to independence), it is not tribal, and it is not racial.
The inhabitants of Rwanda and Burundi share common languages, common
religions, a common culture, and a common past. Attempts to distort history
and paint the current conflicts as age-old rivalries, have been made by Hutu
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and Tutsi alike to advance political goals. The tragedy is that genuine inter-
ethnic hatred is often the real result of such mythical, historical constructs.
The story of Rwanda and Burundi is one of competition for re-
sources, for power over those resources, and for a voice in governance. It is
not, at its base, an ethnic conflict. In other words, were there adequate food,
land, and opportunity for all groups, it is unlikely there would be inter-ethnic
conflict at all. Therefore, solutions which call for ethnic partition, voluntary
population transfers, or federalism, would not work because they do not take
into account the reasons why people behave as they do. Lasting change in
Rwanda and Burundi must insure the continuity of the present boundaries and
cooperation among existing populations. The dual goals of protection and
participation for minorities can best be achieved through a combination of
changes in constitutional and political arrangements, coupled with an im-
proved regional system.
Fundamentally what all individuals and groups want is access. As
Claire Palley, the United Kingdom representative to the U.N. Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities noted in the
presentation of her working paper to that body in 1989, one must judge the
situation of national minorities (or historically disadvantaged groups) by the
extent to which they
*are recognized in States' legal/political institutions;
*enjoy educational or cultural institutions specifically designed to
meet their needs.;
-have been able to achieve improvements in their social and economic
conditions, relative to national society as a whole;
-benefit from positive measures or affirmative action, and the experi-
ence gained from the use of such measures;
-maintain contacts with other members of their group across State
borders .;
-enjoy direct representation in national legislative bodies and partici-
pate in elections, holding public office, and public service generally;
-participate in planning, implementation and benefits of development
activities.; and
-have benefited from agrarian reform or resettlement
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By analyzing these'criteria in the context of Rwanda and Burundi, it
is clear that such provisions are lacking for minority Tutsi as well as for
majority Hutu. These are countries where minority and majority alike need
affirmative action policies to redress past discrimination, protection from
discrimination, and guarantees of representation and participation of all.
Discrimination and apprehension in Rwanda and Burundi transcend ethnic
lines or precise definitions of minority and majority. Indeed, the complexity
of challenges facing these two countries necessitate an equally comprehensive
solution which incorporates domestic and international law, and minority and
individual rights.
130 Claire Palley, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 1989 Sess., annex to working paper, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub2/1989/43.
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